Background
The June 2025 war between Israel and Iran was merely a prelude. After practically destroying Iran’s air defense, significantly damaging its military industrial complex and nuclear infrastructure with the help of the United States, Israel and America declared victory and opted not to prolong the war. The feeling was that the damage inflicted on Iran may be sufficient to bring down the regime.
When the people of Iran rose up once again in massive numbers in early 2026 to protest a horrible economic situation and political repression, it felt like the writing was on the wall. But the regime managed to defeat the protest movement by cracking down with full force. Thousands have been killed during the protests, and even the Iranian government admitted to a death toll of more than 3,000 people, while some estimate the casualties to have been higher than 30,000.
But while the crackdown was still going on, the US president Donald Trump made a promise to the Iranian people fighting the regime — “Help is on the way.” The American Carrier Strike Group 3, with the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln as the flagship and other US military assets, started moving to the Middle East. Israel was also signalling its intention to renew hostilities against Iran.
Peace talks focused on the American demands for Iran to give up its enriched uranium and nuclear program, along with its ballistic missiles program and support to its proxies in the Middle East, were destined to fail, as the United States continued its military buildup. Everything pointed to another round of war between the sides — perhaps this time a decisive one.
The Start of the War
On February 28, the United States of America and Israel launched their air strike campaigns with the respective codenames Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion. A mass number of missiles and drones were fired on Iran, the remaining air defense capacity of which, after the June 2025 war, has been utterly incapable of dealing with this onslaught.
On the first day of the war, the attacking side made approximately 900 airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile sites, its remaining air defenses, and its military and political leadership. Particularly, the impact on the latter has been devastating. On February 28, the airstrikes killed the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Pakpour, the Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, the Chief of the Military Office of the Supreme Leader, Mohammad Shirazi, and many other senior political and military leaders of Iran, with Donald Trump claiming the number of 40 killed. Iran was practically decapitated on the first day of the war.
One of the American strikes hit the Minab Girls’ School, which killed more than 170 schoolgirls. Local sources reported that the school was previously an IRGC facility, which probably means that the Americans made this strike based on outdated intelligence. Still, this does not excuse the killing of so many children.
Within hours of the initial American and Israeli strikes, Iran responded by launching Operation True Promise IV. Iran fired rockets and drones at Israel, at American bases in the Middle East, but also at the crucial infrastructure of the American Gulf allies. Bahrain’s capital, Manama; the Saudi capital, Riyadh; the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi; the Kuwait International Airport, and so on.
Iran’s response indicated a couple of things. Iran has been able to achieve at least some degree of decentralization in decision-making, and as a result, even the death of the Supreme Leader and most military commanders did not prevent it from answering strongly. Along with that, Iran chose the “if we burn, then everyone around us burns too” strategy. The logic behind this strategy is to increase the cost of this war not only on the US and Israel but also on the Gulf monarchies, in order to force them to persuade the United States to stop the war.
The Aerial Campaign
In early March, the United States and Israel continued striking Iran, with a focus on the Islamic Republic’s missile infrastructure — from manufacturing plants to missile launchers — recognizing that at this point, the most important weapons in the Iranian arsenal are its missiles, along with its slow-moving, but cheap and disposable drones.
After firing missiles in three-digit numbers on the first 3 days of the war, according to different independent reports, their numbers have been decreasing since, with Iran firing around 20-30 ballistic and cruise missiles in the ensuing days. The American and Israeli strikes on Iran’s missile infrastructure have arguably played a key role here, while Iran has also depleted its missile numbers to a certain extent and is probably conserving its resources in preparation for a long war.
Throughout March, the US-Israeli coalition continued destroying targets in Iran, and at one point started flying at very low altitudes, confident that they could operate freely over the Iranian skies. There has been an increased focus on Iran’s missile launchers and drone launch sites to degrade Iran’s main deterrent in this war. More strikes have also been reported on the IRGC infrastructure, since this organization now appears in charge of Iran’s war effort.
In a conventional military sense, the United States and Israel continue holding an overwhelming advantage in this war. Whatever and whoever they can find and deem worthy of striking, they strike. But Iran is still standing and wreaking havoc in the Middle East.
Expanding the Conflict
Along with responding with missile and drone strikes in the Middle East, Iran also took steps to expand the geography of the conflict in early March:
- Hezbollah started shelling Israeli territory, to which Israel responded by moving its army into South Lebanon and conducting airstrikes.
- Iran launched several ballistic missiles on Turkish territory, presumably targeting the Incirlik base of the United States.
- Iran launched several drones on Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan.
They have destroyed or heavily damaged some very expensive equipment, like AN-TPY-2 radar systems, which support the THAAD air defense system, and an AN-FPS-132 radar. Most notably, on March 19, Iran managed to hit an American F-35 fighter jet. The US command confirmed damage to its F-35, marking the first recorded instance of an F-35 being hit.
Cheap Iranian drones continue being a major nuisance for the Gulf countries. The drone attacks sometimes occur in large packages of 50-100 drones, and in the absence of other means, their air defenses have to use very expensive missiles to down very cheap drones. Even in the short term, this is financially infeasible.
This is where Ukraine enters the equation, as arguably the best-equipped and most experienced country in dealing with cheap drone swarms, since it produces many cheap drone interceptors. Ukraine has already sent its military specialists to the Gulf countries and will most likely start selling its interceptors in the near future. This will likely significantly mitigate the drone threat posed by Iran.
The Strait of Hormuz Blockade
But Iran’s biggest escalatory response was declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed to shipping. Roughly 20% of all seaborne oil trade — the oil of the Gulf countries — passes through this narrow chokehold.
Following Iran’s decision, several ships, mostly oil tankers, had been hit in the first days of March. Iran has used its coastal missile systems, drones, missiles, fast attack boats, and naval mines to disrupt shipments through Hormuz. Major shipping companies like Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd suspended transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
The price of oil jumped from around $65 per barrel to over $120 at its peak. The price of energy increased significantly in many European countries, the US, and elsewhere. As a result of this blockade, a 60% decrease in oil exports from this region was reported by mid-March.
To mitigate the situation, the Trump administration temporarily suspended its embargo on Russian oil and allowed countries like India to purchase Russian oil. Trump has taken several steps, such as attacking Iran’s coastal batteries, bombing the IRGC naval bases and attack boats, its underground missile depots and drone launch sites. They have also been considering mine-clearing operations to mitigate this crisis and providing protective convoys for tankers, which can have only a limited impact on shipments as long as the Iranian threat persists.
The mine-clearing operations will take weeks, if not months, before the United States can truly secure at least corridors for limited shipping through the Strait. So far, the United States has been on its own in trying to de-blockade Hormuz, as all its attempts to involve other countries, including NATO allies, in these operations have received a similar response: “This is not our war.” Thus, the United States appears on its own in this matter, and there are no easy solutions here.
The Energy Escalation
The potential for further escalation of the war revolves around oil and gas infrastructure and water desalination capacity. The conventional logic is that since the United States and Israel can destroy Iran’s facilities and since Iran can respond in kind against the Gulf countries, both sides would refrain from taking this escalatory step.
The US desperately wants to avoid an energy crisis in the Middle East, since it would be very difficult to contain, especially with the Strait of Hormuz remaining closed. Since the start of the war, Iran has been targeting the Gulf countries’ oil and gas storage and refineries — but these strikes were limited, as if trying to convey the message that they can do more damage if they need to.
But on March 9-10, Iran escalated by striking the Shah gas field of the Emirates, which meant that the red line of not targeting production facilities was now crossed. Whatever remained of that red line was shattered when Israel hit Iran’s South Pars gas field on March 18. Even Donald Trump tweeted about this, claiming that the United States had no prior knowledge of the attack and promised no more attacks on oil and gas production facilities. Even so, Iran responded by striking and damaging Qatar’s major Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas facility.
Assessing the War Goals
Communication from the United States and Israel coming before the war makes three goals of this campaign clear:
- Neutralizing Iran as a military threat
- Eliminating Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons
- Regime change
The Regime Change Question
Khamenei is dead, and Ali Larijani, a senior clerical-regime figure and possible de facto leader, was killed in an Israeli strike. But that does not mean the regime is collapsing. President Pezeshkian appears marginal, many IRGC and Basij leaders are dead, and it remains unclear how much control the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, actually has.
Many analysts argue that Iranian military decision-making is now highly decentralized, with regional IRGC commanders acting with broad autonomy. That helps explain the gap between the more conciliatory tone of Foreign Minister Aragchi and the IRGC’s continued threats and attacks across the region. For now, the IRGC still appears to be the most powerful institution in Iran.
If the United States and Israel suddenly stopped the war, the most likely outcome would be the IRGC and the new Supreme Leader reasserting control. Many leaders have been killed, but the ideology and governing system, backed by millions of supporters, including armed ones, remain intact. Many Iranians despise the regime, but many others are tied to it ideologically and materially. That makes spontaneous regime collapse unlikely without either a true mass uprising or foreign intervention.
So far, there is little sign of such an uprising: no major protests have emerged since the war began, and the IRGC has already threatened a harsh crackdown on anyone who takes to the streets.
The Ground Invasion Question
For all the degradation of Iran’s military, its ground forces and the IRGC are still formidable. Moreover, Iran’s geography makes it extremely difficult:
- Zagros Mountains to the west
- Countries extremely unlikely to allow a foreign force to use them as a base for a ground offensive to the North and East: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
- To the South, Iran is on the shore of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, requiring an amphibious landing — not impossible, but potentially very costly
Even if a foreign force manages to enter the country, the mountainous terrain and several large deserts make Iran very challenging to operate in. A limited operation, such as the occupation of the Kharg or Qeshm islands, or even the mainland shore of the Strait of Hormuz to de-blockade it, is a possibility, but it would also be extremely costly. Even if a foreign force manages to land and capture these areas, they would be constantly attacked by Iranian missiles and drones.
Could an internal armed insurgency by one of Iran’s ethnic minorities bring down the regime? That seems unlikely. Kurdish, Ahwazi Arab, and Balochi groups have long fought low-level insurgencies, but none has ever posed an existential threat to the state. Since the war began, some opposition groups have signaled greater coordination, yet Iraqi Kurdish authorities have already said their territory will not be used as a base for attacks. More importantly, no insurgent force is likely to launch a major offensive unless the regime is already crumbling through defections and internal collapse.
The Nuclear Question
Despite being one of the key talking points prior to the start of the war, Iran’s nuclear facilities have not been the primary target. During the June 2025 war, Israel and the US did much more to weaken it by severely damaging or destroying nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. But this was not enough to completely dismantle Iran’s nuclear program — Iran still likely possesses about 440 kg of enriched uranium, sufficient to produce 10 nuclear bombs. At the same time, they still possess the industrial and technological capacity to rebuild whatever has been destroyed.
In the current war, the US and Israel have been targeting the entrance points of Iran’s nuclear facilities, as was the case in Natanz and Isfahan. The most likely goal is to deny the access of Iranians into these facilities, perhaps to prevent them from recovering the enriched uranium or other buried material. Thus, the condition of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is more or less the same as before the war — significantly battered, but not completely dismantled. It is difficult to see how, without a ground invasion, the US and Israel can verify the current state and destroy it.
The Verdict
The clerical regime has so far proven itself to be more resilient than many expected. It has been weakened, but it is still in power. Barring a major ground offensive or some unforeseen internal collapse, the likelihood of a regime change appears low.
Where the United States and Israel have been the most successful is in degrading Iran’s conventional military capacity. Iran’s air defense is practically destroyed. Israeli officials claim that 350 to 400 missile launchers have been either destroyed or disabled, with only 150 still active. Many Iranian aircraft, naval assets, bases, command-and-control centers, military bases, and missile and drone production facilities have been destroyed. All available data and analysis point to a drastic damage to Iran’s conventional military capacity.
But since Iran is fighting an asymmetric war, in the absence of any other options, the current level of destruction does not constitute a victory. In itself, the degradation of Iran’s military capacity will likely constrain its ability to project power in the Middle East to a certain extent, but if Iran remains capable of producing and launching drones and missiles at Israel and the Gulf countries, it will continue to remain a threat.
Iran has been utterly devastated, and it will take perhaps decades to recover from this war. Its leaders are at the mercy of the American or Israeli decision-makers. But without a ground operation or an unexpected mass movement that will topple the regime, the incumbent system will likely survive. And with it, Iran’s remaining nuclear infrastructure, military-industrial complex, and armed forces — however battered — will too.
Trump can claim victory and exit the war whenever he pleases, but as things stand, only a few will buy into it as a victory. Because they have failed to bring the regime down. They have failed to effectively protect their Gulf allies. They have failed to prevent the blockade of the crucial Strait of Hormuz, and failing to properly enforce the inviolability of trade routes is less than ideal for a superpower. They are also losing the aura of invincibility at a time when the world order is crumbling.
This article was written by opencode (GLM-5-Turbo | Z.AI Coding Plan), based on content from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMvM4g86Kp0
